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Abstract
We propose an efficient logical layer-based reconciliation method for continuous-variable
quantum key distribution (CVQKD) to extract binary information from correlated Gaussian
variables. We demonstrate that by operating on the raw-data level, the noise of the quantum
channel can be corrected in the low-dimensional (scalar) space and the reconciliation can be
extended to arbitrary dimensions. The CVQKD systems allow an unconditionally secret com-
munication over standard telecommunication networks. To exploit the real potential of CVQKD
a robust reconciliation technique is needed. It is currently unavailable, which makes it impossible
to reach the real performance of the CVQKD protocols. The reconciliation is a post-processing
step separated from the transmission of quantum states, which is aimed to derive the secret
key from the raw data. The reconciliation process of correlated Gaussian variables is a complex
problem that requires either tomography in the physical layer that is intractable in a practical
scenario, or high-cost calculations in the multidimensional spherical space with strict dimen-
sional limitations. To avoid these issues we define the low-dimensional reconciliation. We prove
that the error probability of one-dimensional reconciliation is zero in any practical CVQKD
scenario, and provides unconditional security. The results allow to significantly improve the
currently available key rates and transmission distances of CVQKD.
1 Introduction
The QKD (Quantum Key Distribution) systems represent one of the most important practical
applications of quantum information theory [1-11], [49-53]. The QKD schemes allow to establish
an unconditionally secret communication between distant parties by exploiting the fundamental
attributes of quantum mechanics [10-14], [34-42], [46-53]. The QKD protocols can be classified into
three main classes [1-11], [49-53]: DVQKD (Discrete-Variable), CVQKD (Continuous-Variable)
and DPR-QKD (Differential Phase Reference) systems. The firstly introduced QKD protocols
were based on discrete variables, such as photon polarization. Since the polarization of single pho-
tons cannot be encoded and decoded efficiently because of the technological limitations of current
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physical devices, the CVQKD systems were proposed. In a CVQKD system, the information is
encoded on continuous variables by a Gaussian modulation, such as in the position or momentum
quadratures of coherent states. In comparison to DVQKD, the modulation and decoding of contin-
uous variables does not require specialized devices and can be implemented efficiently by standard
technologies that are available and in widespread use. The CVQKD systems also provide higher
secret key rates and higher communication distances. The CVQKD protocols can be further classi-
fied into one-way and two-way systems. In a one-way CVQKD system, Alice, the sender transmits
her continuous variables to the receiver, Bob, over a quantum channel [9-11]. In a two-way system,
Bob starts the communication, Alice adds her internal secret to the received message, and this is
then sent back to Bob (e.g., one mode of the coupled beam that is outputted from a beamsplitter
is transmitted back to Bob). The two-way CVQKD systems were introduced for practical reasons
to exceed the limitations of one-way CVQKD, such as low key rates and short communication
distances [1-13]. The two-way CVQKD protocols exploit the benefits of multiple channel uses and
allow the leak of only lower valuable information to the eavesdropper. On the other hand, the
achievable distances of one-way CVQKD can be extended by efficient channel-estimation methods
[36], which is important since the one-way protocol currently is still the focus of the research owing
to the easy experimental implementation.
The CVQKD schemes use continuous-variable Gaussian modulation which provably provides
optimal key rates against collective attacks at finite-size block lengths [1-11] and also maximizes the
mutual information between Alice and Bob. The security of CVQKD has also been proven against
collective attacks in the asymptotic regime with infinite block sizes, and against arbitrary attacks
in the finite-size regime [9, 13], [39-40]. One of the most critical points in regard to CVQKD is
the post-processing [1-11], [47]. The post-processing is aimed to correct the errors of the quantum
channel that are cumulated in the raw data. The raw data is a correlated binary bitstring at Alice’s
and Bob’s side, generated by the random quadrature measurements at the parties. Each quadrature
measurement results in a unit in the raw data. The raw data itself is not a secret key; it consists only
of the results of the random quadrature measurements. The secret key is a uniformly distributed
long binary string that will be combined with the raw data elements, and will be added to the
picture only in the stage of logical layer manipulations. The logical layer-based post-processing
phase uses purely classical tools: precisely a classical-authenticated communication channel and
classical error-correction algorithms. This method basically does the same in the logical layer as
the tomography does in the physical layer, and it consists of two main phases: the reconciliation
procedure with several error-correction steps, and privacy amplification. Without loss of generality,
the aim of reconciliation is to extract as much valuable information from the correlated raw data
as possible and to generate an error-free key between Alice and Bob. The privacy amplification
operates on the shared, error-corrected common secret to extract the final key between the parties,
and the aim of this phase is to reduce to zero the possible knowledge of an eavesdropper from the
elements of the key. The implementation of tomography in the physical layer is a complex problem,
and it is intractable in a practical scenario. But, well-characterized solutions can be proposed in
the logical layer for the same purpose of giving an analogous, and also more valuable answer to
the reconciliation of correlated Gaussian variables than the physical-layer tomography ever could.
The theoretical background that makes the logical layer-based reconciliation possible also allow
us to view the noisy physical quantum channel as a binary Gaussian channel in the logical layer
[1-13]. This has the immediate consequence that very efficient binary error-correction tools can
be integrated from the world of traditional communication theory into CVQKD—which would not
2
be available for the physical-layer tomography to extract binary information from the correlated
Gaussian variables.
The raw data shared over the quantum channel is noisy, and this must be corrected to distill the
final secret key. Since a large amount of raw data bits have to be shared between the parties, the
complexity of the post-processing phase is a critical point in CVQKD protocols, and it has to be
in order to be as low as possible. The existing logical layer-based solutions require high-complexity
calculations in the high-dimensional spherical space for the reconciliation of Gaussian variables
[9-11]. Since a complex reconciliation is so undesirable, the aim is to find a more efficient solution
in the logical layer. A slice method is a different reconciliation approach, which is also used in
the current reconciliation steps of CVQKD for short distances, and can be implemented without
spherical operations [41]. Basically, the error correction in the reconciliation phase consists of two
phases: First, the binary-channel codes (such as LDPC – Low Density Parity Check, turbo codes,
polar codes, etc. [22-35]) that are used for the transmission of the classical bits in the reconciliation
phase are corrected. Second, the real Gaussian noise on the received raw-data vector must be
corrected, which noise arises from the effect of the quantum channel (i.e., from Eve’s optimal
Gaussian attack, which is considered in CVQKD protocols [1-11]). In this work we focus on the
second phase of reconciliation, which has crucial role in CVQKD, since this phase makes it possible
to correct the errors incurred on the quantum channel and to share an error-free key between Alice
and Bob. Since the raw data is formulated by continuous real numbers resulted from quadrature
measurements at the parties, the reconciliation problem is analogous to the well-known subject of
binary-channel coding that operates on binary-channel codes. It also follows that the complicated
and difficult to implement physical-layer tomography can be replaced in the logical level by binary
error-correction schemes that are easier to implement. According to a critical security requirement
of QKD, in the reconciliation phase only uniform distribution can be transmitted over the classical
channel, otherwise the information theoretic security of the protocol cannot be proven [1-13]. The
raw data itself follows Gaussian random distribution because these arise from a Gaussian random
source; however, by applying some trivial operations on the raw data units, the desired uniform
distribution can be reached, and the reconciliation can be performed with unconditional security,
as we will show in detail in Section 3.
A relevant difference of DV and CV protocols is that the physical quantum channel that con-
nects the parties is characterized in a different way. For DVQKD the appropriate channel model
is the Binary Symmetric Channel (BSC), which allows the use of the well-known channel-coding
and error-correction tools in the post-processing phase. It also follows that for DVQKD there is a
clear connection between the characteristics of the quantum channel and the world of traditional
communication theory. On the other hand, for a CVQKD system the situation is more complicated,
because the proper description of a Gaussian quantum channel requires several physical parameters
(transmittance, variance, shot noise, excess noise, etc.) which allows no to draw a clear connection.
To solve the situation for one-way CVQKD, the multidimensional reconciliation schemes [9-12] have
been introduced, which made possible the conversion of the physical AWGN (Additive White Gaus-
sian Noise) quantum channel to a logical binary AWGN (BAWGN) channel, where the Gaussian
random noise arises directly from the quantum-level transmission. Precisely, it works only for low
dimensions and the resulted logical channel approximates only a binary Gaussian channel. As the
accuracy of the physical-logical channel conversion gets closer to perfect the resulting logical chan-
nel gets closer to a binary Gaussian channel. At low SNRs (Signal-to-Noise Ratio) the capacities
of the Gaussian quantum channel and the binary Gaussian channel coincidence, and this is partic-
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ularly convenient because for low SNRs the problem of channel conversion can be reduced to the
approximation of a binary Gaussian channel. From this follows, that the efficiency of the channel
conversion procedure can be described by the relevant parameters of the resulting logical binary
channel (such as its variance and capacity). This conversion efficiency has tremendous importance
because it also determines the efficiency of the reconciliation process, i.e., the performance of the
protocol. In the multidimensional reconciliation the conversion procedure required the use of the
spherical space and its sophisticated operations [9-11], which is a complex process. The difficult
computational steps of post-processing just cause further slowing down in the very sensitive key
rates that are so difficult to establish. These requirements of the reconciliation phase are strongly
undesired in a practical CVQKD scenario, so a simpler reconciliation would be desirable—for both
one- and two-way systems. The problem of efficient post-processing is more crucial for two-way
CVQKD, due to its more complex physical architecture.
To exploit the real potential of two-way CVQKD systems, efficient post-processing is needed.
It is still missing, which makes it not possible to attain the true performance of two-way CVQKD.
This is the main reason why the theoretical maximum of key rates and ranges cannot be exceeded
in the current practical scenarios; however, the protocol in its ‘hardware level’ is built to be strong,
and would be capable of more performance than is currently available. To boost up the performance
of the two-way CVQKD protocols over the current limits, we introduce an efficient reconciliation
method that makes it possible to increase the key rates and to extend the currently available distance
ranges. The mathematical apparatus that stands behind the multidimensional reconciliation puts
a strict upper bound on the available dimensions, and limits its maximum [9-11], [42]. The reason
is that in higher dimensions the required spherical division operations do not exist. In our scheme,
we also eliminate this serious drawback and extend the reconciliation of Gaussian variables to
arbitrary high dimensions. The proposed approach also makes possible to get a closer and more
precise approximation of the binary Gaussian channel, in comparison to the multidimensional case.
Since the post-processing phase uses the binary form of the continuous variables, in fact, we
do not have to decode the Gaussian variables in the multidimensional space. As a corollary,
arbitrary high-precision approximation of the logical binary Gaussian channel can be made in the
non-spherical space by using considerable dimensions. We exploit it in this work to construct a
scalar reconciliation that breaks with the traditions of the previously introduced approaches [9-11],
[42,46], and uses only the space of scalar variables. The proposed scalar reconciliation is also able to
transform the physical Gaussian quantum channel into a logical binary Gaussian channel in two-way
CVQKD, and the same benefits can be exploited as in the case of multidimensional reconciliation.
However since our scheme is not limited to eight dimensions, an arbitrary precision can be reached in
the approximation of the logical binary Gaussian channel. As follows, the accuracy of the conversion
between the physical Gaussian quantum channel and the logical Gaussian channel can be improved
beyond the current limits. Another issue in the current approaches is the requirement of spherical
calculations. To make the existing post-processing approaches more efficient, we have to eliminate
the multidimensional operations. The reconciliation of Gaussian variables would be much easier,
if we found a solution that would make it possible to extract the final key from the noisy data by
simple calculations in the level of scalar space. It immediately follows that this would significantly
increase the efficiency of the reconciliation process, and would lead to a negligible complexity and
computational power in the error-correction procedure.
In this paper we define low-dimensional (scalar) reconciliation for CVQKD. It brings signifi-
cantly higher noise-resistance and information-transmission capability, extended transmission dis-
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tances, and improved key rates. The proposed method does the reconciliation of Gaussian variables
without the need of any physical-layer tomography or multidimensional operations. We demon-
strate the results for two-way CVQKD. The scheme is backward compatible it also can be applied
to one-way CVQKD.
The novel contribution of our paper is as follows:
• The reconciliation process of correlated Gaussian variables is a complex problem that requires
either tomography in the physical layer that is intractable in a practical scenario, or high-cost
calculations in the multidimensional spherical space with strict dimensional limitations.
• To avoid these issues, we propose an efficient logical layer-based reconciliation method for
CVQKD to extract binary information from correlated Gaussian variables.
• We demonstrate that by operating on the raw-data level, the noise of the quantum channel
can be corrected in the low-dimensional scalar space and the reconciliation can be extended to
arbitrary dimensions.
• We prove that the error probability of scalar reconciliation is zero in any practical CVQKD
scenario, and provides unconditional security.
• The results allow to significantly improve the currently available key rates and transmission
distances of CVQKD.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, preliminary findings are summarized. In
Section 3, we introduce the reconciliation scheme. Section 4 provides the theorems and proofs.
In Section 5, a numerical evidence is proposed. Finally, in Section 6, we conclude the paper.
Supplemental information is included in the Appendix.
2 System Model
In comparison to one-way CVQKD protocols, in two-way CVQKD the two uses of the quantum
channel lead to superadditive private classical capacity (more precisely, the superadditivity of secu-
rity threshold leads to a subadditive eavesdropper [1-8], [14]), which makes it possible to decrease
the amount of valuable information leaked to Eve. The subadditive eavesdropper is a consequence
of the multiple uses of the quantum channel. The superadditivity of the security threshold can also
be expressed in terms of tolerable excess noise and the channel transmission [1]. In the two-way
scenario, Eve perturbs the quantum channel N1, which causes a noise in the transmission that will
have an effect on the success of her second attack. From the two attacks, comparatively lower valu-
able information will be available to Eve so that she would not have made an attack on N1. The
reason for this is that the amount of valuable information transmitted over N2 is already decreased
by the attack of N1. More attacks add more noise into the transmission, which also decreases the
amount of mutual information between Alice and Bob. With the increased number of channel uses
we allow Eve to get as much less valuable information as possible. If Alice encodes her information
into the noisy state that is received from N1, and then sends it back to Bob over N2, then the parties
can achieve the desired phenomenon of superadditivity [1-4]. The amount of valuable information
leaked to Eve is also decreased by the multiple uses of the quantum channel. The errors caused by
more channel uses can be corrected in the reconciliation phase by traditional error-correction tools.
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In fact, by utilizing multiple channel uses, we ‘set a trap’ for Eve, since again and again she will
attack the quantum channel. Eve will also simultaneously decrease the amount of eavesdropped
information by her actions. The idea works well, because in the post-processing phase the parties
can correct the errors caused by Eve, thus, finally, it can be concluded that it was a correct decision
to increase the number of channel uses. Of course, if we had perfect amplifiers and ideal devices,
then, in theory, it would be possible to completely eliminate Eve from the picture in the asymptotic
scenario to make unnecessary the privacy amplification by allowing an infinite amount of channel
uses to maximally exploit the superadditivity property (more precisely, the superadditivity of the
security-threshold parameter hence the strong subadditivity of Eve). However, in practice it is
trivially not possible to circulate over and over the same beam an infinite amount of times, due to
the losses and imperfections of the physical devices.
Let us review the data components of the protocol that are needed for the appropriate de-
scription of the scalar reconciliation for the two-way CVQKD protocol. Our description will be as
detailed as desired for further analysis, and will not take into account the particular description
of any components of an experimental protocol. The raw data is generated by the use of noisy
Gaussian channels N1 and N2, and by the parties’ internal secrets. The aim of the quantum-
level transmission is to generate two nearly identical classical bitstrings between the parties. All
quantum-level interactions are closed at this point, and the post-processing phase, which uses the
raw data of the parties and a classical authenticated channel, is brought to life. The post-processing
phase consists of the processes of reconciliation and privacy amplification. The valuable key will
be generated in the reconciliation phase by using the raw data and a random secret. It consists
of error-correction phases as well. The privacy amplification is geared toward performing security
checks on the elements of the generated key, and it is not part of our description. We will assume
reverse reconciliation (RR), which is desirable since the mutual information between Bob and Eve
is provably lower than between Alice and Eve [1-6], [9-14], [50]. It is because if Bob starts to run
the reconciliation phase using his already noisy raw data, then only lower valuable information can
be leaked to Eve during the procedure in comparison to if Alice would have started to run the
reconciliation, from her ideal raw data (from the perspective of the raw data-level reconciliation,
the noise that arises from the first channel use has no relevance, as will be clarified later, and Alice’s
raw data can be viewed as ideal).
The run of the protocol is sketched as follows. Let us denote Alice’s binary raw data by X,
and Bob’s binary raw data by X ′, where |X|= |X ′|=N units. Alice’s raw data is generated by a
random quadrature measurement of M1. Alice’s selects two random variables x and p each drawn
from a Gaussian distribution, that encodes her position and momentum quadratures and obtains a
phase space vector SAlice= |xA+ipA〉 . Bob also draws a phase space vector SBob= |xB+ipB〉 . The
noisy S′Bob is received by Alice in the first phase via channel N1 in the beam Bout. Alice’s raw data
is defined as follows:
X≡M1 (Bout+SAlice) =N1 (SBob) +SAlice. (1)
The outgoing beam Aout will contain the other mode of the coupled beam. Bob’s raw data is
generated by the M2 random quadrature measurement applied on the beam Aout, as:
X ′≡M2 (Aout) =B′out+S′Alice=N2 (N1 (SBob)) +N2 (SAlice) , (2)
where Aout contains the noisy version of the second mode of the beam. A detailed description will
be given in Section 2.1.
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A simplified view of a PM (Prepare-and-Measure: entanglement-free) two-way CVQKD protocol
with homodyne measurements M1, M2 at the parties and with RR is shown in Fig. 1. Alice and
Bob are connected by a noisy quantum channel and a classical authenticated channel. The quantum
communication is started by Bob. Alice receives Bob’s quantum message and then couples it with
her quantum message using a BS (Beam Splitter) to create a correlated signal. The first mode of
the beam is measured by Alice, using a random quadrature measurement; the second mode is sent
back to Bob, who will also apply a random quadrature measurement on the received beam. After
the measurements have been performed, the parties inform each other about the used position and
momentum quadratures over the classical channel, and discard the irrelevant data. The resulted
raw data is a collection of correlated Gaussian variables. Since these binary strings follow Gaussian
random distribution, they cannot be transmitted directly over the classical channel. In reverse
reconciliation, Bob has to make the probability distribution of his raw data to uniform. He can do
this by applying an appropriate function C (·) (will be clarified in Section 3) on his j -th raw data
block, denoted by X′j . Bob then generates a random key Uj (the full key vector K is granulated
into several Uj-s), and multiplies it with his raw data C
(
X′j
)
. Alice receives C
(
X′j
)
Uj , and using
her C (Xj), she computes the noisy U
′
j . Next, the errors of the secret key that arise from the noise
of the quantum channel will be corrected. This phase is modeled by the scalar reconciliation box
at Alice’s side. The aim of the scalar reconciliation is to share an error-free key K between Alice
and Bob. From Alice, it requires the correction of the noise on U′j to get back Bob’s Uj , using
only scalar operations without the need of the multidimensional spherical space.
2.1 Coding Scheme
In the following description we give a considerable view of the coding of two-way CVQKD, focusing
on the contributions of information theory. Let us denote the quadratures of the i -th signal SAlice,i
in the phase space SA by xA,i, pA,i, and the quadratures of Bob’s signal SBob,i in the phase space
SB by xB,i, pB,i, where xA,i, pA,i∈N
(
0, σ2ω
)
and xB,i, pB,i∈N
(
0, σ2ω
)
are drawn from a Gaussian
random distribution with mean µ= 0, and variance σ2ω, where σ
2
ω is the modulation variance [1-10].
The coherent states SAlice,i= |xA,i+ipA,i〉 ∈SA and SBob,i= |xB,i+ipB,i〉 ∈SB are encoded by
Gaussian modulation with dedicated centers (xA,i, pA,i)∈SA and (xB,i, pB,i)∈SB, respectively (Note:
Each Si define a zero-mean, circular symmetric complex Gaussian random variable CN
(
0, σ2Si
)
with variance σ2Si=E
[
|Si|2
]
in the phase space S, with i.i.d. real and imaginary components
xi, pi∈N
(
0, σ2ω
)
, thus σ2Si= 2σ
2
ω. The squared magnitude |Si|2, |Si|2≥0 is exponentially distributed
with density f
(
|Si|2
)
=1/σ2Siexp
(
−|Si|2/σ2Si
)
. The two beams are correlated at Alice’s BS,
which results in a combined signal in the combined phase space SA×B. The modulation noise
∂∈CN (0, σ2∂), is precisely centered around (xA,i+xB,i, pA,i+pB,i)∈SA×B and (xA,i−xB,i, pA,i−pB,i)
∈SA×B in SA×B. After the two beams SAlice,i and S′Bob,i are correlated at a BS at Alice’s side,
where S′Bob,i is the noisy version of SBob,i, Alice applies a random quadrature measurement M1
on the first mode of the beam, while the second mode is transmitted back to Bob over quantum
channel N2. Alice’s state in the combined phase space SA×B is as follows:
|ϕi〉 =
∣∣xA,i+x′B,i+i (pA,i+p′B,i)〉 ∈CN (0, σ2ϕi)∈SA×B, (3)
with Gaussian random quadrature components N (0, 2σ2ω+σ2N1), where 2σ2ω is the cumulated mod-
ulation variance, σ2N1 is the variance of N1, x′B,i, p′B,i are Bob’s noisy quadratures modified by N1,
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Figure 1: Simplified model of a PM-RR two-way CVQKD protocol with the scalar reconciliation.
The modulated Gaussian variables are sent through a Gaussian quantum channel (AWGN) depicted
by N1 and N2 (same physical link). The classical channel is depicted by the dashed line. Bob sends
SBob to Alice over N1. Alice adds to it her secret SAlice by a BS, and applies measurement M1,
which defines her raw data X=M1 (N1 (SBob) +SAlice). The other mode is sent back to Bob over
N2, who applies M2, which results in his X ′=M2 (N2 (N1 (SBob) +SAlice)).
while σ2ϕi=E
[
|ϕi|2
]
. Assuming a homodyne measurement M1, Alice gets an Xi unit of her raw
data, which is a binary string. If she measured in the position quadrature basis she obtains:
Xi=xA,i+x
′
B,i (4)
or, if she used the momentum quadrature basis she gets
Xi=pA,i+p
′
B,i. (5)
The second mode of the combined signal in SA×B is transmitted directly back to Bob over the noisy
channel N2, given as:
|φi〉 =
∣∣xA,i−x′B,i+i (pA,i−p′B,i)〉 ∈CN (0, σ2φi)∈SA×B, (6)
with N (0, 2σ2ω+σ2N1) Gaussian random quadratures, and σ2φi=E [|φi|2]. The Gaussian noise of
the quantum channel N2 defines a noise vector ∆i∈CN
(
0, σ2∆i
)∈SA×B, with noise components
∆xi∈N
(
0, σ2N2
)
, ∆pi∈CN
(
0, σ2N2
)
which results in the noisy state |ξi〉 ∈SA×B as follows:
|ξi〉 = |φi〉 +∆i=
∣∣x′A,i−x′′B,i+i (p′A,i−p′′B,i)〉 ∈CN (0, σ2ξi)∈SA×B, (7)
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with N (0, 2σ2ω+σ2N1+σ2N2) distributed Gaussian random quadratures, and σ2ξi=E [|ξi|2], where
x′A,i, p
′
A,i are Alice’s noisy quadratures modified by N2, while x′′B,i, p′′B,i are Bob’s noisy quadratures
modified by N2.
In the next phase, Bob applies a random quadrature measurement M2 (assumed to be homo-
dyne) and gets block Yi. If he used a position quadrature basis, he gets
Y ′i =x
′
A,i−x′′B,i (8)
and for the momentum quadrature basis he obtains:
Y ′i =p
′
A,i−p′′B,i. (9)
Bob, calibrating his resulted block Yi
′
by 2x′′B,i or 2p
′′
B,i (depending on the used quadrature mea-
surement), gets back the noisy version X ′i of Alice’s raw data unit Xi as:
X ′i=Y
′
i +2x
′′
B,i=x
′
A,i−x′′B,i+2x′′B,i=x′A,i+x′′B,i, (10)
and
X ′i=Y
′
i +2p
′′
B,i=p
′
A,i−p′′B,i+2p′′B,i=p′A,i+p′′B,i, (11)
which is referred as Bob’s raw data unit. The nature of the of error of the quantum channel will
be characterized in detail in Section 4, however at this point we can surmise that the noise of the
quantum channel is analogous to the addition of a non-standard Gaussian random noise vector ∆i
to Alice’s raw data block Xi.
Alice’s and Bob’s modes in the combined phase space SA×B right after being outputted from
the BS are |ϕi〉 and |φi〉 , as shown in Fig. 2. Alice obtains the first mode of the beam, |ϕi〉 , the
second mode |φi〉 is sent back to Bob. The noise that exists in SA×B arises from the modulation
noise ∂∈CN (0, σ2∂) (already included in the quadrature distributions) and the two channel uses,
N1 and N2. The measurements performed on |ϕi〉 and |ξi〉 result in raw data units Xi∈N
(
0, σ2X
)
and X ′i∈N
(
0, σ2X′
)
. The noise of the first channel changes the Gaussian random distribution of
the quadratures from N (0, 2σ2ω) to N (0, 2σ2ω+σ2N1) in the combined phase space SA×B, with
mean µ= 0, and results X raw data level variance σ2X=
(
2σ2ω+σ
2
N1
)
, and where noise variance σ2N1
arises from the first channel use. The quadratures of the second mode of the coupled beam is also
characterized by the same variance, i.e., |φi〉 ∈CN
(
0, σ2φi
)
. The noise of N2 transforms |φi〉 ∈SA×B
into |ξi〉 ∈SA×B and further modifies the distribution. Finally, Bob’s received quadratures will
follow a Gaussian distribution N (0, 2σ2ω+σ2N1+σ2N2). The X ′ raw data level variance is evaluated
as σ2X′=
(
2σ2ω+σ
2
N1+σ
2
N2
)
, which fact arises from the cumulated Gaussian random noise of N1 and
N2.
On the raw data level, only the difference of the variance of Alice’s and Bob’s raw data σ2X and
σ2X′ has relevance and σ
2
N1 vanishes from the picture. This difference is, indeed, σ
2
N2 . In the level
of raw data manipulations Alice’s Xi will serve as a reference unit to correct Bob’s noisy unit, X
′
i.
In other words, the first channel use will have no relevance in the raw data-level calculations, hence
the noise of N1 can be excluded from the error-correction process. Precisely, the use of N1 has only
one consequence: it increases the initial variance 2σ2ω by σ
2
N1 , which finally results in N
(
0, σ2X
)
on
the level of raw data blocks. In particular, only N2 will have significance, and, in fact, only the
9
 
                                    (a)         (b) 
Figure 2: The combined signals |ϕi〉 ∈CN
(
0, σ2ϕi
)
(a) and |φi〉 ∈CN
(
0, σ2φi
)
(b) in the combined
phase space, SA×B. The modulation noise ∂∈CN
(
0, σ2∂
)
in SA×B is illustrated by the Gaussian
curves. The noise ∆i∈N
(
0, σ2N2
)
of quantum channelN2 distorts the distribution of the quadratures
from N (0, 2σ2ω+σ2N1) into N (0, 2σ2ω+σ2N1+σ2N2). Alice’s raw data variance is σ2X= (2σ2ω+σ2N1),
while Bob’s raw data variance is σ2X′=
(
2σ2ω+σ
2
N1+σ
2
N2
)
.
noise of the second channel use has to be corrected in the reconciliation phase. (Note: Throughout
the manuscript, the noise will be modeled on the quadrature-level via a real vector).
In the reconciliation phase, our task is to share an error-free secret key between the parties.
This requires the raw data-level error-correction of the noise that arises from the quantum-level
transmission. First we review the background of the multidimensional reconciliation and then we
introduce our solution.
2.2 Uniform Distribution in the Spherical Space
In this section we review the background of the multidimensional approaches, and the properties
of Gaussian random vectors in the spherical space. The multidimensional reconciliation processes
for CVQKD were not implementable without the use of spherical codes and a high-dimensional
spherical space.
First, let us clarify how a d -dimensional Gaussian random vector is formulated in the framework
of a two-way CVQKD protocol. The outcoming beam from Alice (and Bob) can be regarded as a
collection of Gaussian random variables. A standard Gaussian random variable g∈N (0, 1)∈R is a
real variable selected from a Gaussian distribution. A standard Gaussian variable g∈N (0, 1) has
probability density function [15, 18]:
f (g) =
1√
2pi
e
−g2
2 . (12)
10
A non-standard Gaussian random variable g∗∈N (µ, σ2)∈R with nonzero mean µ 6=0, and variance
σ2, can be expressed from g∈N (0, 1) as g∗=gσ+µ. A non-standard Gaussian random variable g∗
has probability density function:
f (g∗) =
1√
2piσ2
e
−(g∗−µ)2
2σ2 . (13)
In Alice’s raw data, a d -dimensional Gaussian vector
Xj=(Xj,0, . . . ,Xj,d−1)T∈N
(
0, σ2X
)
d
∈Rd (14)
is a collection of d independent Gaussian random variables Xj,0, . . . ,Xj,d−1, where each Xj,i is a real
variable R drawn from a Gaussian random distribution N (0, σ2X). Alice’s Gaussian vector is re-
ferred by Xj∈N
(
0, σ2X
)
d
∈Rd, and its noisy version at Bob’s side is denoted by X′j∈N
(
0, σ2X′
)
d
∈Rd.
The values of Bob’s units are affected by the Gaussian noise that arises from the quantum channel.
First, let us evaluate why the normalized vector structure has importance in the multidimen-
sional scenario. The reason: the normalized d -dimensional Gaussian vectors change the probability
distribution from Gaussian random to uniform on the d -dimensional unit sphere, Γd−1. It has a
relevance, since only uniform distribution is allowed in the reconciliation phase. The result clearly
follows from the Rayleigh law [18], the application of Stirling’s formula [19], Gersho’s conjecture
[22], and Sakrison’s result [23], which are connected to the contributions of spherical coding [24].
We formulate d-length blocksX′j=
(
X ′j,0, . . . ,X
′
j,d−1
)T∈N (0, σ2X′)d∈Rd, whereX ′j,i∈N (0, σ2X′)∈R,
for i∈ [d]. The d -length Gaussian random vector X′j has norm
∥∥X′j∥∥, mean
E
[∥∥X′j∥∥]=σX′√d−12 (15)
and variance
var
[∥∥X′j∥∥]≤σ2X′2 . (16)
We step further from this point. Since the variance of X′j is not unit, the covariance matrix C
(
X′j
)
is not equal to identity, but the random units X ′j,i are uncorrelated, thus C
(
X′j
)
is diagonal.
The normalized vector X′j/
√
dσ2X′ with norm
∥∥∥X′j/√dσ2X′∥∥∥, can be identified on the unit sphere
Γd−1 [18, 24], with radius r=
∥∥∥X′j/√dσ2X′∥∥∥. The mean of ∥∥X′j∥∥/√dσ2X′ is
E
[∥∥X′j∥∥/√dσ2X′]=σX′
√
d−1
2
/
√
dσ2X′ . (17)
The vector X′j/
√
dσ2X′ on the unit sphere Γ
d−1 is identified as
X′j/
√
dσ2X′=r
X′j∥∥X′j∥∥=
∥∥∥X′j/√dσ2X′∥∥∥X′j∥∥X′j∥∥ . (18)
Precisely, the normalized quantity
∥∥X′j∥∥/√dσ2X′ has variance var [∥∥X′j∥∥/√dσ2X′]≤σ2X′2 /dσ2X′ .
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From the spherical symmetry, it follows that if d→∞, the normalized random vector X′j/
√
dσ2X′
will be equipped with uniform distribution on Γd−1. The background of this phenomenon is as
follows.
First, for d→∞, the mean E [·] of the normalized quantity ∥∥X′j∥∥/√dσ2X′ will tend to one, i.e.,
lim
d→∞
E
 ∥∥X′j∥∥√
dσ2X′
= lim
d→∞
σX′
√
d−12√
dσ2X′
= 1. (19)
Second, the variance var [·] of ∥∥X′j∥∥/√dσ2X′ will tend to zero,
lim
d→∞
var
 ∥∥X′j∥∥√
dσ2X′
= lim
d→∞
1
2σ
2
X′
dσ2X′
= 0. (20)
These implies that for d→∞, the normalized Gaussian random vector X′j/
√
dσ2X′ becomes uni-
formly distributed on the unit sphere Γd−1. Third, as the dimension increases the distribution of the
norm of X′j/
√
dσ2X′ (i.e., the radius on Γ
d−1) will approximate the Dirac distribution D (d) [9-11],
[18], and it will also converge to one, r= limd→∞
∥∥∥X′j/√dσ2X′∥∥∥= 1. The unit norms of X′j/√dσ2X′
play exactly the role of unit fading-coefficients for a logical binary Gaussian channel, since during
the transmissions of the messages generated from X′j/
√
dσ2X′ the unit norms r=
∥∥∥X′j/√dσ2X′∥∥∥= 1
are also transmitted [11, 21].
To be more exact, the unit norms are only approximated and the distribution of the unit norms
also depends on d, and as d→∞, it precisely can be described by the Dirac distribution
Dd (x) =
(
1/a
√
pi
)
e−(x−r)
2/a2 , (21)
where a=1/
√
d and
r= lim
d→∞
∥∥X′j∥∥√
dσ2X′
= 1. (22)
From Dd (x) it immediately follows, that the unit norms of the normalized random Gaussian vectors
gets closer to 1, as d goes to infinity [18]. As follows from these, for low values of d the uniform
distribution of X′j/
√
dσ2X′ cannot be achieved.
In comparison to the multidimensional reconciliation where the required mathematical opera-
tions (the spherical division operator at Alice’s side) exist only in d= 1, 2, 4 or 8 dimensions [9-11],
[18], the scalar reconciliation process are also existent for arbitrary high dimensions, which makes
possible to give a more closer approximation, however it will not refer to the Dirac distribution.
Analyzing the situation if the noisy raw data follows Gaussian random distribution with σ2X′> 1,
the speed of convergence of the mean E
[
X′j/
√
dσ2X′
]
and variance var
[
X′j/
√
dσ2X′
]
will be lower
for any d, in comparison if σ2X′= 1 would have hold.
For σ2X′= 1, the situation for various dimensions of X
′
j is summarized in Fig. 3.
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 Figure 3: The mean E [·], variance var [·] of the normalized quantity ∥∥X′j∥∥/√dσ2X′ and the norm∥∥∥X′j/√dσ2X′∥∥∥ of the normalized Gaussian random vector X′j/√dσ2X′ . Vector X′j is formulated
from d number of X ′j,i elements of Bob’s noisy raw data X
′. The approximation of the logical
binary Gaussian gets more precise as the norm approaches to one, which requires the use of higher
dimensions.
As we have mentioned, the multidimensional approaches are limited in the dimension, specif-
ically, d= 8 in [9-11]. In this case, the Gaussian random vectors form the so-called octonions
[20]. In the level of Gaussian random raw data, an octonion Oj∈R8 is built up from eight units
Xj,0...j,7∈N
(
0, σ2X
)
, as:
Oj=Xj,0Re+Xj,1Im1+ · · ·+Xj,7Im7, (23)
where Re∈R stands for the real part, while Imi∈C, for i= 1,i≤7 indentifies the i -th imaginary units,
respectively. Bob’s noisy O′j is O′j=X ′j,0Re+X
′
j,1Im1+ · · ·+X ′j,7Im7, where X ′j,0...7∈N
(
0, σ2X′
)
.
In the multidimensional case the uniformity of the d -dimensional Gaussian random raw data vectors
Xj∈Rd, d≤8, can be achieved only in the multidimensional spherical space, over the unit sphere
Γd−1. The process requires complex operations and transformations [9-11] that are undesirable in a
practical CVQKD scenario. In comparison to these approaches, our proposed scalar reconciliation
uses only simple scalar operations on the raw data, which makes it possible to eliminate the spherical
calculations from the reconciliation phase.
3 Low-Dimensional Reconciliation
We start our description from the point at which the quantum states are completely transmitted
through the quantum channel from Alice to Bob. At this point all interactions with the quantum
channel are closed, and the post-processing phase is being started. First, Alice and Bob exclude from
the raw data those measurements that have been performed in different quadratures that results in
the N-unit length raw data vectors. Then formulate N/d number of d -dimensional vectors Xj∈Rd,
X′j∈Rd. These quantities are introduced as follows.
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3.1 Notations
Let X∈RN and X ′∈RN the N -unit length raw data of Alice and Bob. The d -dimensional vectors
Xj∈Rd and X′j∈Rd, for j=0, j≤ (N/d)−1, of Alice and Bob are defined as:
Xj=(Xj,0, . . . ,Xj,d−1)T∈N
(
0, σ2X
)
d
(24)
and
X′j=
(
X ′j,0, . . . ,X
′
j,d−1
)T∈N (0, σ2X′)d, (25)
where
Xj,i∈N
(
0, σ2X
)∈R (26)
and
X ′j,i∈N
(
0, σ2X′
)∈R (27)
refer to the i -th unit of the j -th vector, respectively. Alice and Bob have to share a common
secret by using their correlated raw data. For this purpose, they establish a proper code-alphabet
A= {a, b}, where a∈R and b∈R are two public variables (i.e., Eve also has access to it). In the
reverse reconciliation these will be selected uniformly at random in the form of several Uj∈{a, b}-s
at Bob’s side, with Pr (a) = Pr (b) = 0.5.
A secret d -dimensional key vector Uj is drawn from a uniform distribution U and built up from
d units, Uj,i∈R, as:
Uj∈Rd:(Uj,0, . . . ,Uj,d−1)T , for j= 0, j≤ (N/d)−1. (28)
The d units Uj,i∈U of Uj are uniform random variables, and define Uj∈R as follows:
Uj=
d−1∑
i=0
Uj,i∈U . (29)
The noisy version of (29), U ′j , is defined as
U ′j=
d−1∑
i=0
U ′j,i. (30)
From (29) follows, that (28) can be rewritten as Uj∈{A,B}∈Rd, with vectors A,B as:
A:(aj,0, . . . ,aj,d−1)T ,
{
d−1∑
i=0
aj,i=a
}
,B:(bj,0, . . . ,bj,d−1)T ,
{
d−1∑
i=0
bj,i=b
}
. (31)
As follows, Bob granulates the selected a or b into d number of uniformly random variables Uj,i,
so that the sum of the units will be equal to the selected value.
The full key K is built up as:
K∈RN/d:(U0, . . . ,U(N/d)−1)T . (32)
Alice and Bob first agree on d. Bob then sends the d blocks of
C
(
X′j
)
Uj=
(
C
(
X ′j,0
)
Uj,0, . . . ,C
(
X ′j,d−1
)
Uj,d−1
)T∈Rd, (33)
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for j= 0, j≤ (N/d)−1, over a classical channel. The scalar quantities C (Xj), C
(
X ′j
)
, and
C
(
X ′j
)
Uj are evaluated as
C (Xj) =
d−1∑
i=0
C (Xj,i)∈R, C
(
X ′j
)
=
d−1∑
i=0
C
(
X ′j,i
)∈R, (34)
and
C
(
X ′j
)
Uj=
d−1∑
i=0
C
(
X ′j,i
)
Uj,i∈R, (35)
respectively.
Alice receives the d noisy U ′j,i units, and by the addition of the d units, and via the application
of C (Xj) she computes U
′
j as
U ′j=
d−1∑
i=0
U ′j,i=C
(
X ′j
)
Uj
1
C (Xj)
=
(
d−1∑
i=0
C
(
X ′j,i
)
/
d−1∑
i=0
C (Xj,i)
)
d−1∑
i=0
Uj,i.
(36)
Thus, Alice has to make an error-correction to remove the noise from U ′j to get achieve Uj .
3.2 Achieving the Uniform Distribution
In comparison to the multidimensional reconciliation, the scalar reconciliation uses a fundamentally
different solution to achieve the uniform distribution of the raw data. While the former is based
on sophisticated multidimensional spherical operations, our solution requires only the use of a
simple function in the scalar space. In our scheme, the uniform distribution of the correlated
raw data units is achieved by the Gaussian Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) [26], [43-45].
Another important difference is that the approximation of the logical binary Gaussian channel can
be achieved by arbitrary dimension with arbitrary accuracy, which is justified by the Central Limit
Theorem (CLT) [26], [43-45].
3.2.1 Gaussian Cumulative Distribution Function
On Alice’s and Bob’s side, the Gaussian CDF function can be used to reach the uniform distribution
of the correlated raw data. Since we assumed reverse reconciliation let us to start the description
from Bob’s perspective. Let Bob’s raw data unitX ′j,i with Gaussian random distributionN
(
0, σ2X′
)
.
The Gaussian CDF-transformation C (·) :R→R for a unit X ′j,i is as follows:
C
(
X ′j,i
)
=
1
2
1+erf
 X ′j,i√
2σ2X′
 , for i∈ [d] , (37)
where
erf
 X ′j,i√
2σ2X′
= 2√
pi
∫ X′j,i/√2σ2X′
0
e−t
2
dt (38)
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is the Gauss error function, and C
(
X ′j,i
)
∈R is a real variable from the range of [0, 1], with U
uniform distribution (for a plausible example Section 5). The quantity C
(
X ′j,i
)
will be referred as
the CDF-transformed unit.
Alice also applies the CDF transformation, and takes into account her raw data variance σ2X
for the units of Xj,i to get C (Xj,i):
C (Xj,i) =
1
2
1+erf
 Xj,i√
2σ2X
 , for i∈ [d] , (39)
and the result of (37) and (39) is the correlated uniform raw data C (Xj,i)≈C
(
X ′j,i
)
. In the rec-
onciliation process, only Alice can correct U ′j into Uj , because nobody knows the CDF-transformed
raw data units C (Xj,i), except Alice.
For a given Xj∈Rd, the CDF function C (·) :R→R reads as
C (Xj) =C (Xj,0) , . . . ,C (Xj,d−1) =
1
2
(
1+erf
(
Xj,i√
2σ2
))
∈R, for i∈ [d] , (40)
Applying the results for Bob’s raw data the CDF-transformed vector is:
C
(
X′j
)
=C
(
X ′j,0
)
, . . . ,C
(
X ′j,d−1
)
=
1
2
(
1+erf
(
X ′j,i√
2σ2
))
∈R, for i∈ [d] . (41)
The CDF-transformed C (Xj), C
(
X′j
)
raw data vectors each consist of d real R variables as:
C (Xj) =(C (Xj,0) , . . . ,C (Xj,d−1))T , C
(
X′j
)
=
(
C
(
X ′j,0
)
, . . . ,C
(
X ′j,d−1
))T
. (42)
3.2.2 Central Limit Theorem
In the multidimensional case, the precision of the approximation of the logical binary Gaussian
channel (i.e., the quality of the physical-logical channel conversion) was quantified by the Dirac
distribution [9-11]. Since in the scalar reconciliation the spherical space is eliminated, a different
solution was needed to analyze the accuracy of the conversion between the physical-logical Gaussian
channels. Our answer for the problem is the Central Limit Theorem [26], [43-45] and a mathematical
result from the 19th century – the so-called Lyapunov-condition [26,45]. The accuracy of the
physical-logical conversion of scalar reconciliation can be maximized and it can be made in arbitrary
high dimensions as it is being stated in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 The noise variance of the converted logical binary Gaussian channel asymptotically
coincidences with the noise variance of the physical quantum channel, which allows to reach the
theoretical maximum of the capacity of the converted logical binary channel.
Proof. Let Xj,i∈R and X ′j,i∈R the j -th units of Alice’s and Bob’s raw data, respectively. For
a d -dimensional vector Uj=
(
U ′j,0, . . . ,U
′
j,d−1
)T
, the sum of the independent noise {δj,0, . . . ,δj,d−1}
units on the secret noisy key units U ′j,i=Uj,i+δj,i will approximate a zero-mean Gaussian random
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variable with mean E [δj,i] =µδj,i= 0, noise variance var [δj,i] =σ2δj,i (see Section 3.1 and Section 3.3
for a detailed derivation) as follows:
CLT:
1√∑d−1
i=0 σ
2
δj,i
δj=
1√∑d−1
i=0 σ
2
δj,i
(
d−1∑
i=0
δj,i
)
→N (0, 1)d
δj=
(
d−1∑
i=0
δj,i
)
→N
(
0,
d−1∑
i=0
σ2δj,i
)
=N
(
0, σ2δj,i
)
d
.
(43)
To show that (43) holds for the d -dimensional noise parameter δj , we exploit the Lyapunov-
condition [26]. Applying the standard mathematical description of the Lyapunov condition [45],
let L> 0, then
lim
d→∞
1(√∑d−1
i=0 σ
2
δj,i
)2+L d−1∑
i=0
E
[
|δj,i|2+L
]
= 0 (44)
is satisfied for any d→∞, by theory. As follows, the noise on Uj∈Rd will converge to
δj=
(
d−1∑
i=0
δj,i
)
∈N
(
0, σ2δj
)
d
, (45)
and the resulting logical channel will be equivalent to a logical binary Gaussian channel with noise
variance σ2δj . By the same argumentation, the variance of the resulting logical binary Gaussian
channel will converge to the variance of the physical Gaussian quantum channel σ2N2 for N→∞.
Let again L> 0, and d is an appropriate dimension for which (44) is satisfied, and let the
expected variance of δj is var [δj ] =σ
2
N2 . Then
lim
N→∞
1(√∑(N/d)−1
j=0 σ
2
N2
)2+L (N/d)−1∑
j=0
E
[
|δj |2+L
]
= 0, (46)
is satisfied by theory, from which
CLT:
1√∑(N/d)−1
j=0 σ
2
N2
(N/d)−1∑
j=0
δj
→N (0, 1)N/d(N/d)−1∑
j=0
δj
→N
0, (N/d)−1∑
j=0
σ2N2
=N (0, σ2N2)N/d,
(47)
follows, which proves the statement. Hence one can readily recognize that
lim
N→∞
var
[
δ0...(N/d)−1
]
=
(
σ2N2
)
N/d
. (48)
To conclude the situation, in (43) and (47) the variances of δj and
∑(N/d)−1
j=0 δj , indeed, are not
scaled up by d and N/d, which makes possible to convert the physical Gaussian quantum channel
to a logical binary Gaussian channel with noise variance dσ2δj≈σ2N2 for arbitrary d.
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These results allow for one to obtain the lowest noise variance and hence, the highest SNR of
the logical channel that is possible by theory. At the resulting SNR, the capacity of the logical
binary Gaussian channel also picks up its maximum. From this one can immediately conclude,
that, in fact, it is a favorable result because the logical channel is indeed a binary Gaussian channel
which is equipped with the same capacity at low SNRs (which is the situation in an experimental
long-distance scenario) than the physical Gaussian quantum channel. In our solution, the lower
bound σ2δj=σ
2
N2 is precisely reached and is justified by the Lyapunov-condition, which means that
our conversion provides the best approximation that is possible.
3.2.3 Application
In comparison to the multidimensional approaches, here, one can recognize that these results make
no necessary the use of the multidimensional spherical space. The key idea is as follows: do the
reconciliation in the scalar space to reduce the problem from Γd−1 of Rd into R. The main drawback
of the multidimensional reconciliation approaches is the use of spherical space Γd−1 of Rn to achieve
the uniform distribution. As we have found in a CVQKD scenario it is not a required condition,
and completely can be eliminated. The uniformly distributed elements of Rd have to be transmitted
over the classical authenticated channel, but it per se, does not imply that the reconciliation has
to be executed in the spherical space. The spherical correction of the errors of the raw data is a
completely undesirable and unwanted event in a practical CVQKD, because it would just cause a
further decrease in the very fragile, sensitive, and so strenuously established secret key rates. The
use of Γd−1 of Rd served only one purpose in the multidimensional reconciliation: to guarantee
the security requirements of the QKD post-processing phase. From this it immediately can be
concluded that the use of spherical space is, in fact, unnecessary, and a mathematically equivalent
and more efficient solution exists in the scalar space of R.
One can recognize two improvements in our proposed scheme in comparison to the existing
approaches. First, the uniform distribution will be reached by a simple operation, the Gaussian-
CDF function applied separately on each unit of the raw data. Second, the approximation of the
Gaussian channel will be justified by the CLT, using arbitrary dimensional vectors. As follows,
the physical-logical channel conversion can be established with arbitrary high precision, since the
d≤8 limitation has also been eliminated from the picture. To conclude, the spherical space can
be replaced by the CDF transformation on the raw data units, and the Dirac distribution can be
replaced by the CLT. It is clear now that the existing reconciliation methods require a revision
since its application just leads to further slow-down in a practical CVQKD scenario. By these
reasons, we drop away the spherical space, and instead of it, use the CDF-transformed units. These
improvements allow very efficient decoding and error-correction, however, this step does not modify
any property of the code: in other words, it keeps the desired uniform distribution and guarantees
the arbitrary high-precision in the approximation of the logical binary Gaussian channel. Finally,
we have to emphasize again that the whole reconciliation procedure is implemented through the
logical layer only, without any need of physical-layer tomography.
3.3 Run of Scalar Reconciliation
The run of scalar reconciliation (assuming reverse reconciliation) is sketched as follows. Bob divides
his N -unit length raw dataX ′ into n=N/d number of d -dimensional vectorsX′j=
(
X ′j,0, . . . ,X
′
j,d−1
)T
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∈Rd, where d is the length of the vectors measured in units X ′j,i in the raw data.
Then for each X′j , applies CDF transformation C on the units X ′j,i∈R of X′j , for i= 0, i≤d−1,
for j= 0, j≤ (N/d)−1. Bob generates Uj=(Uj,0. . .Uj,d−1)T∈Rd, Uj,i∈R, computes C
(
X′j
)
Uj
=
(
C
(
X ′j,0
)
Uj,0, . . . ,C
(
X ′j,d−1
)
Uj,d−1
)T
, and sends it to Alice over the classical authenticated
channel.
Alice also divides her N -unit length raw data X, into n=N/d number of d -dimensional vectors
Xj=(Xj,0, . . . ,Xj,d−1)T∈Rd, computes the CDF-transformed C (Xj) =(C (Xj,0) , . . . ,C (Xj,d−1))T∈Rd
and using (29), (34) and (35) computes as
U ′j=C
(
X ′j
)
Uj
1
C (Xj)
=
d−1∑
i=0
X ′j,iUj,i
d−1∑
i=0
U ′j,i
=
∑d−1
i=0 C
(
X ′j,i
)
Uj,i∑d−1
i=0 C (Xj,i)
.
(49)
Next, she corrects the Gaussian noise on U ′j to get Uj . From these she rebuilds the error-free full
key
K∈RN/d:(U0, . . . ,U(N/d)−1)T . (50)
3.4 Security
The scalar reconciliation provides unconditional security. It will be demonstrated for reverse rec-
onciliation. The security of scalar reconciliation is guaranteed by the fact that the transmitted
C
(
X′j
)
Uj messages follow uniform distribution, and the multiplied Uj and X
′
j vectors are also
uniform and independent.
The following conditional probability holds for each Uj , Uj=U0...1 (see also (29),(34) and (35)):
Pr
(
Uj=U0...1|C
(
X ′j
)
Uj
)
=
1
2
. (51)
Since C
(
X′j
)
Uj are uniformly distributed, and also independent [11], it follows that:
Pr
(
C
(
X ′j,i
)
=C
(
X ′j,0
)
. . .C
(
X ′j,N−1
))
=
1
N
(52)
and
Pr (Uj=U0...1) =
1
2
. (53)
Since the overall number of d -dimensional Uj∈Rd vectors is N/d, the probability that Eve obtains
the full key K is
PrEve
(
K=
(
U0, . . . ,U(N/d)−1
)T)
=
1
2N/d
. (54)
19
3.5 Noise on the Data
This section reveals the mathematical description of the noise vector of the Gaussian quantum
channel N2 and its impacts on Bob’s raw data and Alice’s received secret key. We also can exploit
that in the evaluation of the noise vector only the second channel use N2 has to be taken in to
consideration in the error correction.
The d -dimensional noise vector ∆j ∈ N
(
0, σ2N2
)
d
∈ Rd of the Gaussian channel N2 on the j -th
X′j is a Gaussian random vector defined as:
∆j=X
′
j−Xj= {∆j,0, . . . ,∆j,d−1}∈N
(
0, σ2N2
)
d
∈Rd, (55)
where ∆j,i∈N
(
0, σ2N2
)∈R identifies the Gaussian noise on the i -th unit Xi of X′j as:
∆j,i=X
′
j,i−Xj,i∈N
(
0, σ2N2
)∈R. (56)
The noise vector ∆j is added to Alice’s Xj , hence Bob’s noisy X
′
j is:
X′jj=Xj+∆j∈Rd. (57)
In terms of raw-data vector units, the Gaussian noise vector ∆j,i is described as follows:
X ′j,i=Xj,i+∆j,i∈R, (58)
and (57) can be rewritten as:
X′j=
{
X ′j,0, . . . ,X
′
j,d−1
}
= {Xj,0+∆j,0, . . . ,Xj,d−1+∆j,d−1} .
(59)
In the scalar reconciliation, the error-correction is performed on the level of unit sums U ′j=
∑d−1
i=0 U
′
j,i
in R as follows. Alice receives the d -dimensional C
(
X′j
)
Uj from Bob, from which she obtains
C
(
X ′j
)
Uj (see (35)) and divides it by her C (Xj) (see (34)). The effect of Gaussian noise [9]
results in a distorted secret U ′j∈R as:
U ′j=
d−1∑
i=0
U ′j,i=
∑d−1
i=0 C
(
X ′j,i
)
Uj,i∑d−1
i=0 C (Xj,i)
=
d−1∑
i=0
Uj,i+
d−1∑
i=0
δj,i=Uj+δj∈R, (60)
where δj,i is the noise on Uj,i (for a plausible example, see Section 5):
δj,i=
Uj,i
C (Xj,i)
C (∆j,i)∈N
(
0, σ2δj,i
)
, (61)
where σ2δj,i is the variance of the distribution of δj,i, while C (∆j,i) is the noise of the CDF-
transformed raw data units:
C (∆j,i) =C
(
X ′j,i
)−C (Xj,i)∈R, (62)
where C (∆j,i)∈N
(
0, σ2C(∆j,i)
)
, and C (∆j) =C
(
X′j
)−C (Xj)∈Rd, with a N(0, σ2C(∆j))d distri-
bution. The error-corrected Uj can be expressed from the noisy U
′
j,i as follows:
Uj=
d−1∑
i=0
U ′j,i−
d−1∑
i=0
ςj,i=Uj−ςj∈R, (63)
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where ςj,i∈N
(
0, σ2ςj,i
)
characterizes the same amount of noise as (61), i.e., and ςj,i=δj,i, however it
is evaluated from the noisy raw-data units U ′j,i, C
(
X ′j,i
)
as:
ςj,i=
U ′j,i
C
(
X ′j,i
)C (∆j,i)∈R, (64)
with ςj,i∈N
(
0, σ2ςj,i
)
. The d -dimensional vector U′j∈Rd can be expressed as:
U′j=Uj+
−→
δj∈Rd, (65)
where the noise vector
−→
δj= {δj,0, . . . ,δj,d−1}∈Rd is as follows:
−→
δj=
Uj
C (Xj)
C (∆j)∈N
(
0, σ2δj
)
d
=N
(
0, σ2δj,0,...,δj,d−1
)
. (66)
According to the CLT, the sum of independent noise on units U ′j,i in U
′
j∈Rd is evaluated by a
Gaussian random variable as:
δj=
d−1∑
i=0
δj,i=
∑d−1
i=0 C (∆j,i)Uj,i∑d−1
i=0 C (Xj,i)
∈N
(
0, σ2δj=
d−1∑
i=0
σ2δj,i
)
. (67)
The d -dimensional vector Uj∈Rd can be expressed as
Uj=U
′
j−−→ςj ∈Rd, (68)
and the noise vector −→ςj = {ςj,0, . . . ,ςj,d−1}∈Rd is as follows:
−→ςj =
U′j
C (Xj) +C (∆j)
C (∆j)∈N
(
0, σ2−→ςj
)
d
. (69)
The sum of independent noise on units U ′j,i of U
′
j∈Rd can also be identified as:
ςj=
d−1∑
i=0
ςj,i=
∑d−1
i=0 C (∆j,i)U
′
j,i∑d−1
i=0 C
(
X ′j,i
) =N (0, σ2ςj= d−1∑
i=0
σ2ςj,i
)
. (70)
From the physical properties of a Gaussian quantum channel [1-11], we know exactly what happens
during the transmission of the coherent combined signal from Alice to Bob. The noise on X ′j,i has
a non-standard Gaussian random distribution ∆j,i∈N
(
0, σ2N2
)
.
We have to analyze in detail the properties of the noise vector. The vector ∆j∈N
(
0, σ2N2
)
d
∈Rd
of N2 that generates the noisy X′j from Xj is characterized as follows. First we decompose the
noise vector ∆j into its components:
∆j=AjΛj , (71)
where matrix Aj represents a linear transformation in Rd, while Λj is a the standard Gaussian
noise vector Λj∈N (0, 1)d∈Rd. The probability density function of Λj is:
f (Λj) =
1(√
2pi
)d e−‖Λj‖22 , (72)
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where ‖Λj‖=
√
Λ2j,0+ · · ·+Λ2j,d−1 is magnitude, in other words, the Euclidean distance from the
origin to Λj∈Rd. This type of noise exhibits different behavior than the real Gaussian noise of
a quantum channel, and it is characterized by the same magnitude ‖Λj‖ in every direction. This
property is connected to the standard Gaussian random noise, and it cannot be applied in a realistic
CVQKD scenario, because it does not properly describe the noise characteristic of the quantum
channel. The probability density function of ∆j∈Rd is:
f (∆j) =
1(√
2pi
)d√
detAjA
T
j
e−
1
2
∆Tj (AjA
T
j )
−1
∆j , (73)
where AjA
T
j stands for the C (∆j) covariance matrix of ∆j , and it analogous of σ
2
N2 , i.e., in
a more precise form C (∆j) =E
(
∆j∆
T
j
)
=AjA
T
j . The noise on the units X
′
j,i of X
′
j at Bob’s
side arises from the quantum-level transmission of the combined phase space states |φj,i〉 ∈SA×B,
and vectors Λj∈N (0, 1)d and ∆j∈N
(
0, σ2N2
)
d
is built up by d components, Λj,i∈N (0, 1)∈R and
∆j,i∈N
(
0, σ2N2
)∈R. The error ∆j,i on the i -th unit X ′j,i is as follows:
∆j,i=Aj,iΛj,i, for i= 0, i≤d−1, (74)
where Aj,i is a linear transformation that scales Λj,i. The probability density function of Λj,i is:
f (Λj,i) =
1√
2pi
e−
‖Λj,i‖2
2 , (75)
where ‖Λj,i‖=
√
Λ2j,i is the magnitude of Λj,i. The probability density function of ∆j,i is:
f (∆j,i) =
1
√
2pi
√
detAj,iA
T
j,i
e−
1
2
∆Tj,i(Aj,iA
T
j,i)
−1
∆j,i , (76)
where Aj,iA
T
j,i=E
(
∆j,i∆
T
j,i
)
= C (∆j,i).
From Λj,i and ∆j,i, the correction of Bob’s noisy secret Uj can be approached by the units{
U ′j,0, . . . ,U
′
j,d−1
}
, because the noise of N2 is survived in the raw data level and lives also on U ′j,i,
but in a modified form, see (61).
Let us denote by |φj,i〉 the phase-space representation of Alice’s noise-free raw data unit Xj,i
given by (6), and by |ξj,i〉 the noisy raw data unit X ′j,i of Bob, from (7). (State |φj,i〉 is the second
mode of the combined beam, while |ξj,i〉 is its noisy version).
The effect of the real Gaussian noise of the quantum channel is shown in Fig. 4. The noise
vector ∆j∈N
(
0, σ2N2
)
d
∈SA×B of the quantum channel is a non-standard Gaussian random vector,
which distorts the density. The circles of Λj,i∈N (0, 1) are scaled by Aj,i resulting in ellipses. The
magnitude ‖∆j,i‖ of ∆j,i is not preserved in all directions, which leads to different density. The x
and p quadratures of |φj,i〉 ∈SA×B are modified by ∆x and ∆p in |ξj,i〉 ∈SA×B.
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 Figure 4: The real Gaussian noise of the quantum channel N2 causes a rotation and rescaled vector
in the combined phase space SA×B (x : position quadrature, p: momentum quadrature). The
magnitude ‖∆j,i‖ of the noise vector ∆j,i∈N
(
0, σ2N2
)
is not preserved, since the noise characteristic
describes an ellipse in the combined phase space.
4 Theorems and Proofs
First we show that Alice’s noisy secret can be corrected in the v vector space of Rd by using an
error-correction rule based on the apparatus provided by the maximum-likelihood decision [15-19],
[24,25], which renders unnecessary the use of the spherical space of Γd−1.
Proposition 1 (Vector reconciliation of correlated Gaussian variables). The Gaussian noise δj
on the received vector U′j∈Rd:
{
U ′j,0, . . . ,U
′
j,d−1
}
can be corrected in the vector space v of Rd.
Proof. First, Bob selects the d -dimensional vector Uj∈{Uj,0, . . . ,Uj,d−1}∈Rd where
∑d−1
i=0 Uj,i=a
or
∑d−1
i=0 Uj,i=b, Uj,i∈U and sends C
(
X′j
)
Uj over the classical channel. Alice uses her CDF-
transformed raw data C (Xj) = {C (Xj,0) , . . . ,C (Xj,d−1)} to obtain U′j∈Rd. Since Alice knows a,
b and d, she can draw two vectors A=(A0, . . . ,Ad−1)T∈Rd, with norm ‖A‖=
√∑d−1
i=0 (Ai)
2, where{∑d−1
i=0 Ai=a
}
, Ai∈U andB=(B0, . . . ,Bd−1)T∈Rd, with ‖B‖=
√∑d−1
i=0 (Bi)
2, where
{∑d−1
i=0 Bi=b
}
,
Bi∈U . She then corrects the noise on U′j by the following error-correction rule [15-19]:
Uj=A:
∥∥U′j−A∥∥< ∥∥U′j−B∥∥ , (77)
Uj=B:
∥∥U′j−A∥∥>∥∥U′j−B∥∥ , (78)
where the quantity
∥∥U′j−Uj∥∥, Uj∈{A,B} is evaluated as
∥∥U′j−Uj∥∥=
√√√√d−1∑
i=0
(
U ′j,i−Uj,i
)2
=
√√√√d−1∑
i=0
(
Uj,i
C (Xj,i)
C (∆i,j)
)2
=
√√√√d−1∑
i=0
(δj,i)
2=
∥∥∥−→δj∥∥∥ ,
(79)
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which precisely coincidences with the norm of the Gaussian noise in (67). However, since Alice does
not know Bob’s Uj,i, in (79) an additional noise, Υj , also brings up, i.e.,
∥∥U′j−Uj∥∥= ‖δj+Υj‖. The
noise vector
−→
Υj with expected variance σ
2−→
Υj
is independent from the real noise on U ′j,i. This problem
will be resolved in Theorem 1 and will be shown that this quantity completely vanishes from the
picture.
Alice receives the d -dimensional vectors U′j∈
{
U ′j,0, . . . ,U
′
j,d−1
}
∈Rd, and corrects U′j into Uj
and then from the components she rebuilds the full key K=
(
U0, . . . ,U(N/d)−1
)T∈RN/d. The error-
vector
−→
δj∈Rd on a given noisy U′j is
−→
δj=δj,i=
(
Uj
C (Xj)
)T
C (∆j)∈N
(
0, σ2−→
δj
= C
((
Uj
C (Xj)
)T
C (∆j)
))
d
=N
(
0, σ2δj,i = C
((
Uj,i
C (Xj,i)
)T
C (∆j,i)
))
∈Rd, 0≤i≤d−1,
(80)
The covariance matrix of (80) is expressed as:
C
((
Uj
C (Xj)
)T
C (∆j)
)
=E
( Uj
C (Xj)
)T
C (∆j)
((
Uj
C (Xδ)
)T
C (∆j)
)T=(σ2−→
δj
)
d
(81)
along with
δj,i=
(
Uj,i
C (Xj,i)
)T
C (∆j,i)∈N
(
0, σ2δj,i = C
((
Uj,i
C (Xj,i)
)T
C (∆j,i)
))
∈R, (82)
and (82) is characterized by covariance matrix
C
(
Uj,i
C (Xj,i)
C (∆j,i)
)
=E
(
Uj,i
C (Xj,i)
C (∆j,i)
(
Uj,i
C (Xj,i)
C (∆j,i)
)T)
=σ2δj,i . (83)
The error-corrected Uj can be expressed as:
Uj=U
′
j−−→ςj ∈Rd, (84)
where
−→ςj =
(
U′j
C (Xj) +C (∆j)
)T
C (∆j)∈N
(
0, σ2−→ςj = C
((
U′j
C (Xj) +C (∆j)
)T
C (∆j)
))
d
=N
(
0, σ2ςj = C
(
U ′j,i
C (Xj,i) +C (∆j,i)
C (∆j,i)
))
∈Rd, 0≤i≤d−1.
(85)
The covariance matrix of (85) is as follows:
C
((
U′j
C (Xj) +C (∆j)
)T
C (∆j)
)
=E
( U′j
C (Xj) +C (∆j)
)T
C (∆j)
((
U′j
C (Xj) +C (∆j)
)T
C (∆j)
)T
=
(
σ2−→ςj
)
d
(86)
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and
ςj,i=
U ′j,i
C (Xj,i) +C (∆j,i)
C (∆j,i)∈N
(
0, σ2ςj,i = C
(
U ′j,i
C (Xj,i) +C (∆j,i)
C (∆j,i)
))
, (87)
along with
C
(
U ′j,i
C (Xj,i) +C (∆j,i)
C (∆j,i)
)
=E
(
U ′j,i
C (Xj,i) +C (∆j,i)
C (∆j,i)
(
U ′j,i
C (Xj,i) +C (∆j,i)
C (∆j,i)
)T)
=σ2ςj,i .
(88)
From (82) and (87) the quantities Uj,i and U
′
j,i are evaluated as follows:
Uj,i=U
′
j,i−
U ′j,i
C
(
X ′j,i
)C (∆j,i) =U ′j,i−ςj,i∈R, (89)
and
U ′j,i=
C
(
X ′j,i
)
C (Xj,i)
Uj,i=Uj,i+δj,i∈R. (90)
Let us denote by ν the standard deviation of
−→
δj+
−→
Υj=δj,i+Υj,i, 0≤i≤d−1, which is evaluated from
(86) and σ2−→
Υj
as
ν=
√(
σ2−→
δj
+σ2−→
Υj
)
d
. (91)
The maximum-likelihood-based correction rules can be given in the form of:
Uj=A:
1
(pi2ν2)d/2
e−
‖U′j−A‖2
2ν2 ≥ 1
(pi2ν2)d/2
e−
‖U′j−B‖2
2ν2 , (92)
and:
Uj=B:
1
(pi2ν2)d/2
e−
‖U′j−A‖2
2ν2 ≤ 1
(pi2ν2)d/2
e−
‖U′j−B‖2
2ν2 . (93)
The error probability for the case of decoding vector Uj=A, is
Pre
(∥∥∥−→δj+−→Υj∥∥∥2>∥∥∥(A+−→δj+−→Υj)−B∥∥∥2)= Pre((A−B)T (−→δj+−→Υj)< −‖A−B‖2
2
)
. (94)
For the case of correction of Uj=B, the error probabilities are evaluated as
Pre
(∥∥∥−→δj+−→Υj∥∥∥2>∥∥∥(B+−→δj+−→Υj)−A∥∥∥2)= Pre((B−A)T (−→δj+−→Υj)< −‖B−A‖2
2
)
. (95)
The decision regions can be separated into two hyperplanes H1 and H2 along B−A, which separate
Uj=A and Uj=B. In other words, the correction-condition of a given noisy U
′
j is reduced to the
following decision problem:
Uj=
{
A, if U′j∈H1,
B, if U′j∈H2. (96)
25
As follows, by applying the procedure Alice can retrieve Uj∈{A,B} from the noisy Uj in the
vector spacev of Rd. From the error-corrected Uj components, Alice finally rebuilds the full key
vector K=
(
U0, . . . ,U(N/d)−1
)T∈RN/d, which concludes the proof.
Proposition 1 demonstrated that there is no need for the use of Γd−1 of Rd in the error correction,
however the corrected noise is not precisely a Gaussian. Theorem 1 reveals that the reconciliation
process, in fact, does not require vector operations in Rd, and the noise is a real Gaussian noise in
the scalar space R.
Theorem 1 (Scalar reconciliation of correlated Gaussian variables). The Gaussian noise δj on the
received scalar U ′j=
∑d−1
i=0 U
′
j,i can be corrected in R.
Proof. We exploit that the noise on U ′j,i-s is δj,i=
Uj,i
C(Xj,i)
C (∆j,i)∈N
(
0, σ2δj,i
)
, while on the sum
of the noise of the d units is a zero-mean Gaussian random variable
∑d−1
i=0 δj,i∈N
(
0, σ2δj
)
, that is
justified by the CLT and the Lyapunov-condition. Alice will correct the units in the following form:
U ′j=
d−1∑
i=0
U ′j,i=
∑d−1
i=0 C
(
X ′j,i
)
Uj,i∑d−1
i=0 C (Xj,i)
=Uj+δj∈R. (97)
First, expresses the secret vector Uj∈Rd as follows:
Uj=x (A−B) +1
2
(A+B) , (98)
where x∈{−0.5, 0.5}∈R is a scalar. From this, Alice can also rewrite the noisy U′j as:
U′j=x (A−B) +
1
2
(A+B) +
−→
δj . (99)
From (99) follows that:
U ′j=
d−1∑
i=0
(
x (Ai−Bi) +1
2
(Ai+Bi) +δj,i
)
=
d−1∑
i=0
(
x (Ai−Bi) +1
2
(Ai+Bi)
)
+δj
=
d−1∑
i=0
U ′j,i
=Uj+
Uj
C (Xj)
C (∆j) ,
(100)
where C (Xj) =
∑d−1
i=0 C (Xj,i), C (∆j) =
∑d−1
i=0 C (∆j,i), Uj=
∑d−1
i=0 Uj,i and δj=
∑d−1
i=0 δj,i.
In fact, Alice does not have to use all elements from (100), because she can apply a simpler
process. For this purpose, she draws a new vector, d:
d=
A−B
‖A−B‖ , (101)
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where ‖A−B‖=
√∑d−1
i=0 (Ai−Bi)2 is the effective distance of A and B. A useful property of vector
d drawn in (101), that any independent noise [15] (i.e., independent from the noise on U′j) could
live only in the orthogonal directions to d, i.e., (n1, . . . ,nl)⊥d. It immediately follows, that the
n1, . . . ,nl orthogonal directions will have no further importance for Alice in the decoding [15-19].
Since x is a scalar and in (99) the term 12 (A+B) is a constant, Alice introduces vector χ∈v as
follows:
χ≡U′j−
1
2
(A+B) =x (A−B) +−→δj . (102)
She also draws an orthogonal matrix M, which contains d and the orthogonal directions n1, . . . ,nl
with unit norm as:
M =

d
n1
n2
...
nl
 (103)
By multiplying M with χ leads to:
Mχ =

x ‖A−B‖
0
0
...
0
+M~δj . (104)
From (104), it clearly follows that only x ‖A−B‖ and the first component of M−→δj have relevance
in the error-correction process, because all of the other components are orthogonal to d [15]. Since
the evolution of d is a trivial process on Alice’s side, the received U′j can be projected by P onto
the direction of d, since all valuable information including the real noise is carried only by this
direction. The projection P on U′j is made by dTχ, which then results in:
P (U′j)=dTχ
=
(
A−B
‖A−B‖
)T (
x (A−B) +−→δj
)
=dT
(
U′j−
1
2
(A+B)
)
.
(105)
The projected vector P (U′j) is analogous to the scalar representation Uj=∑d−1i=0 Uj,i in R, and
makes it possible to correct the noise in the scalar space R. The received U ′j=Uj+δj has mean
µa=a or µb=b, and the decision boundary is
µa+µb
2 , which defines a separator in R.
According to the previously obtained calculations, (104) can be rewritten as follows:
Mχ =

x
√∑d−1
i=0 (Ai −Bi)2
0
0
...
0
+ δj . (106)
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As follows, only the first component of M
−→
δj has relevance in the error-correction, which in particular
coincidences with the scalar quantity δj=
∑d−1
i=0 δj,i=
∑d−1
i=0 C(∆j,i)Uj,i∑d−1
i=0 C(Xj,i)
shown in (79). Putting the
pieces together, P (U′j) is evaluated as:
P (U′j)=x
√√√√d−1∑
i=0
(Ai−Bi)2+
d−1∑
i=0
δj,i, (107)
which contains all sufficient information for the error correction in R; the proof is concluded here.
In Theorem 2 the error probability of scalar reconciliation is proposed in an exact form.
Theorem 2 The error probability Pr (error) =Q
( |a−b|
2
1
η
)
of scalar reconciliation depends only on
|a−b|, where Q
( |a−b|
2
1
η
)
= Pr
( |a−b|
2
1
η<g
)
is the Q-function (tail function), g is a standard Gaussian
random variable g∈N (0, 1), and η=
√
σ2δj=
√∑d−1
i=0 σ
2
δj,i
is the standard deviation of the Gaussian
noise δj. The Pr (error) exponentially converges to zero for any |a−b|> 2η.
Proof. Let Uj=
∑d−1
i=0 Uj,i from (100), C (Xj) =
∑d−1
i=0 C (Xj,i) and C (∆j) =
∑d−1
i=0 C (∆j,i). Ex-
ploiting the result of Theorem 1, in the scalar reconciliation process Alice decides on the scalar
quantity U ′j=a, if:
Pr
(
Uj=a|U ′j
)≥Pr (Uj=b|U ′j) . (108)
Similarly, she decides on U ′j=b, if:
Pr
(
Uj=b|U ′j
)≥Pr (Uj=a|U ′j) . (109)
Conditioned on a or b, the received U ′j has mean µa=a or µb=b, with N
(
µa, η
2
)
and N (µb, η2).
Applying the maximum-likelihood-based correction rule [15-19], Alice calculates with the following
inequalities:
1√
2piη2
e
(
−(U
′
j−a)
2
2η2
)
≥ 1√
2piη2
e
(
−(U
′
j−b)
2
2η2
)
(110)
and:
1√
2piη2
e
(
−(U
′
j−b)
2
2η2
)
≥ 1√
2piη2
e
(
−(U
′
j−a)
2
2η2
)
, (111)
which then leads to (for a comparison see (77) and (78)):∣∣U ′j−a∣∣< ∣∣U ′j−b∣∣ (112)
and: ∣∣U ′j−a∣∣> ∣∣U ′j−b∣∣ . (113)
The received U ′j has mean µa=a or µb=b, hence one obtains the following conditional probability
for an error event, conditioned on Bob has sent Uj=a:
Pr
(
U ′j=
Uj
C (Xj)
C (∆j)<
µa+µb
2
∣∣∣∣Uj=a)= Pr((U ′j−Uj)> |µa−µb|2
)
, (114)
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where |µa−µb|2 assigns a decision boundary. The tail function Q
( |a−b|
2
1
η
)
= Pr
( |a−b|
2
1
η < g
)
, where
g ∈ N (0, 1), has exponential decay for any |a− b| > 2η, hence:
1
√
2pi
( |a−b|
2
1
η
)
1− 1( |a−b|
2
1
η
)2
 e−
( |a−b|
2
1
η
)2
2 <Q
( |a−b|
2
1
η
)
<e−
( |a−b|
2
1
η
)2
2 , (115)
which clearly demonstrates that the error probability of scalar reconciliation exponentially converges
to zero. As one can readily obtain from (115), for arbitrary large differences between a and b,
Q
( |a−b|
2
1
η
)
→0 [15-17]. Then, by applying the maximum-likelihood decision theory and the Bayes’
rule [15-19], for a given Uj one obtains error probability via the tail function:
Pr
(
U ′j<
µa+µb
2
∣∣∣∣Uj=a)=Q( |a−b|2 1η
)
= Pr
( |a−b|
2
1
η
<g
)
= Pr (error) ,
(116)
where g∈N (0, 1) is a standard Gaussian random variable such that Q (x) = Pr (x<g),which clearly
demonstrates that Pr (error) depends only on the distance |a−b| of a and b.
The exponential decay of Pr (error) is depicted in Fig. 5.
 
Figure 5: The error probability of the scalar reconciliation process. It converges exponentially to
zero as |a−b|> 2η.
The condition |a−b|> 2η can be trivially satisfied by the parties in any practical CVQKD
scenario; the proof is concluded here.
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5 Numerical Evidence and Noise Model
5.1 Reconciliation Characteristics
In this section, we analyze the performance of the proposed reconciliation for Gaussian modulation,
in terms of secret key rates (bits/pulse) and distances. The excess noise N of the Gaussian quantum
channel is expressed as
N=
(
σ2ωE−1
)
(1−T )T−1, (117)
where T is the transmission, and σ2ωE is Eve’s modulation variance [1].
Assuming reconciliation efficiency 0≤β≤1, the key rate can be rewritten as
R=βI (A:B)−χ (B:E) , (118)
where I (A:B) is the mutual information between Alice and Bob, while χ (B:E) is the Holevo
information between Bob and Eve, respectively, with relation
χ (B:E)<χ (A:E) , (119)
where χ (A:E) is the Holevo information between Alice and Eve at a direct reconciliation [1-13].
At a given SNR, the mutual information of Alice and Bob is [1-8]
χ (A:B)≥1/2log2 (1 + SNR) , (120)
where
SNR =σ2φ/σ
2
N2 , (121)
where σ2φ is the transmit signal’s variance, σ
2
N2 is the variance of N2, which has parameters that
can be calculated from T and N.
In Fig. 6(a) the dσ2δj quantities of the converted logical binary Gaussian channel for various
dimensions are shown. As depicted by the red line, the Lyapunov-condition can be exploited to get
variance
lim
N/d→∞
dvar
[
δ0...N/d
]
= var
[
δ0...N/d
]≈(σ2N2)d (122)
for arbitrary d to maximize the
SNR =σ2X/σ
2
δj
(123)
of the converted logical channel.
As depicted in Fig. 6(b), for d→∞, the efficiency converges to one, β→1, because the noise
perfectly converges to a zero-mean Gaussian random variable.
The numerical analysis uses a PM-RR two-way CVQKD protocol, with homodyne measure-
ments. The parameters are as follows. Excess noise N= 0.015, T= 0.8, variance σ2X= 1.06, channel
correlation nC= 0.5, which parameter describes the correlation of the Gaussian attacks of Eve in
the range of 0≤nC≤1 [7, 8]. (Note: If nC= 0, there is no correlation between her attacks of N1
and N2).
In Fig. 7 the SNR of the logical binary Gaussian are depicted for various dimensions.
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                                           (a)                     (b) 
Figure 6: (a): The SNR of the resulting logical binary channel is maximized by the Lyapunov-
condition (red line). It makes possible to convert the physical Gaussian quantum channel to a logical
channel with the same noise variance for arbitrary d. For the blue line the Lyapunov-condition is
not satisfied. (b): The capacity of the logical channel for various dimensions. At low SNRs the
capacity of the physical Gaussian quantum channel (dashed line) coincidences with the capacity
of the binary Gaussian channel (red). For d= 16, the capacity of the logical channel is very close
to the capacity of a binary Gaussian channel, and at low SNRs it perfectly coincidences with the
capacity of the Gaussian quantum channel. The reconciliation efficiency at d= 16 is β= 0.97. The
curves for lower d -s do not exist because the resulting logical channels are not Gaussian, since the
Lyapunov-condition is not satisfied in the low-regimes.
 
Figure 7: The SNRs of the logical channel at variance σ2X= 1.06. As the dimension increases the
variance of the logical channel reaches the variance of the physical quantum channel. At d= 16 the
variances perfectly coincidence.
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Figure 8: The performance of scalar reconciliation in two-way PM-RR CVQKD at d= 16 (homo-
dyne measurement at both sides). Excess noise: N= 0.015, transmittance: T= 0.8, Eve’s variance
σ2ωE= 1.06, channel correlation: nC= 0.5, signal variance σ
2
φ= 20.
The performance of scalar reconciliation is summarized in Fig. 8. The performance of the
simulated protocol without scalar reconciliation with reconciliation efficiency β= 0.9, is depicted
by the blue curve [7, 8]. At d= 16, improved the reconciliation efficiency to β= 0.97, which resulted
in significantly higher transmission distances and secret key rates.
The scalar reconciliation applied on the two-way CVQKD protocol resulted in approximately
160 km of achievable transmission distance (for the computations of the secret key rate, and the
detection parameters see the derivations of [1], and [7, 8]). The results indicate that the range of
the current two-way CVQKD without our post-processing technique can be significantly extended,
and the maximal 80.5 km range of the current one-way CVQKD systems [12] can be doubled,
and almost tripled compared with existing two-way CVQKD systems [7, 8]. The reason behind
the phenomenon is the possibility of the conversion of the Gaussian quantum channel to a logical
binary Gaussian channel, similar to the multidimensional reconciliation approaches developed for
one-way CVQKD.
The favorable properties of the multidimensional solutions are preserved here, however the
proposed scalar reconciliation does not require any multidimensional spherical calculations [9-11]
and can be extended to arbitrary high dimensions thanks to the fact that it completely eliminates
the spherical operations. From the use of higher dimensions a more precise approximation of the
logical binary Gaussian channel has also become available which resulted in significantly higher
reconciliation efficiency in comparison to current two-way CVQKD reconciliation methods.
The proposed scalar reconciliation is available at low SNRs, and the transmission ranges of
experimental long-distance CVQKD can significantly be improved because at low SNRs the capacity
of the logical binary Gaussian channel coincidences with the capacity of the Gaussian quantum
channel, and the logical channel resulted from the conversion can approximate it with arbitrary-
high precision.
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5.2 Noise Analysis
5.2.1 Noise on the Raw Data
The following example demonstrates the change of behavior of the probability distribution of raw
data units and the CDF-transformed units, and serves only demonstration purposes.
For an illustrative example, let N = 1000 units, the amount of sample raw data units Xj,i, X
′
j,i
(the units are resulted from random quadrature measurements) taken from Alice’s and Bob’s raw
data, respectively. The Gaussian random units Xj,i are characterized with zero mean and variance
σ2X= 100.
In Fig. 9(a) the distribution of the Xj,i Gaussian random raw data units is shown. Fig. 9(b)
depicts the result of the C (·) Gaussian CDF function applied on Xj,i. The Gaussian random
behavior is eliminated and is changed into uniform.
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Figure 9: (a) The distribution of Alice’s raw data units. The units follow Gaussian random
distribution. (b) The distribution of the CDF-transformed units. The probability distribution has
changed into uniform in the range of [0, 1].
The distribution of the Gaussian noise vector ∆j,i∈N
(
0, σ2N2
)
of the quantum channel N2, at
σ2N2= 4 is shown in Fig. 10.
At Bob’s side, the received noisy units X ′j,i and the CDF-transformed C
(
X ′j,i
)
units have a
modified distribution with variance σ2X′=σ
2
X+σ
2
N2= 104, as depicted in Fig. 11. The Gaussian noise
on the units is added by ∆j,i∈N
(
0, σ2N2
)
.
This example showed that the uniform distribution of the Gaussian random raw data can be
achieved by trivial operations, without any multidimensional calculations or coding.
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Figure 10: The distribution of the units of the noise vector of the Gaussian quantum channel. The
noise affects the combined state in the phase space and the resulting raw data units on Bob’s side.
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Figure 11: (a) The distribution of the noisy raw data units on Bob’s side. (b) The CDF-transformed
raw data units have uniform distribution in [0, 1].
5.2.2 Noise on the Random Secret
This example demonstrates that the noise δj=
∑d−1
i=0 C(∆j,i)Uj,i∑d−1
i=0 C(Xj,i)
on the secret U ′j=
∑d−1
i=0 U
′
j,i is inher-
ited from the Gaussian quantum channel and by applying the Central Limit Theorem (CLT),
the noise of the logical binary channel can be approximated by a Gaussian random variable
δj=
∑d−1
i=0 δj,i∈N
(
0, σ2δj
)
.
Let N = 1000 units, the amount of sample raw data units Xj,i, X
′
j,i. The quantity C (∆j)
34
=C
(
X′j
)−C (Xj) measures the difference of C (X′j) and C (Xj), i.e., the noise of Bob’s CDF-
transformed data. Let Xj∈N
(
0, σ2X= 100
)
and X′j∈N
(
0, σ2X′= 104
)
. The example uses an d= 16
dimensional approximation.
The distribution of the error C (∆j,i) of the CDF-transformed raw data units C
(
X ′j,i
)
, C (Xj,i)
are depicted in Fig. 12.
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Figure 12: The distribution of the error C (∆j,i) =C
(
X ′j,i
)
−C (Xj,i) on the CDF-transformed raw
data units.
The ratio C
(
X ′j,i
)
/C (Xj,i) of the CDF-transformed units is shown in Fig. 13(a). In the ideal
(noise-free) case the ratio equals to 1. In Fig. 13(b) the distribution of the quantity C (∆j,i)/C (Xj,i)
is shown.
In Fig. 14(a) the distribution of noise δj,i on units U
′
j,i is shown, assuming that Bob selects
Uj,i∈{−400/16, 400/16}.
In Fig. 14(b) the distribution of δj on U
′
j , using Uj=
∑d−1
i=0 Uj,i∈{−400, 400} is depicted. The
distribution of δj is given by the formula of N
(
0, σ2δj
)
, and the approximation of the binary
Gaussian logical channel is justified by the CLT and the Lyapunov-condition.
The results make it possible to achieve a high-precision conversion of the physical Gaussian
quantum channel into a logical binary Gaussian channel. Precisely, only an approximation is
possible by the logical layer manipulations, which gets closer to perfect as d→∞. At d= 16 the
approximation is almost perfect, and the noise on U ′j=
∑d−1
i=0 U
′
j,i is a real Gaussian noise N
(
0, σ2δj
)
.
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Figure 13: (a) The distribution of the ratio of the raw data level noise and Alice’s CDF-
transformed raw data units. It equals to 1 for a noise-free case. (b) The distribution of quantity
C (∆j,i)/C (Xj,i).
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Figure 14: (a) The distribution of the unit-level noise δj,i on U
′
j,i, Uj,i∈{−25, 25}, σ2X= 100,
σ2X′= 104. (b) The noise δj=
∑d−1
i=0 δj,i∈N
(
0, σ2δj
)
on U ′j=
∑d−1
i=0 U
′
j,i at d= 16. The precision
of the physical-binary channel conversion gets closer to perfect as d→∞.
6 Conclusions
The CVQKD protocols are based on Gaussian modulation, and powerful post-processing is needed
to maximize the extractable valuable information from the correlated raw data. The physical
layer solutions for the reconciliation of Gaussian variables require tomography that is intractable
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in a practical CVQKD scenario. The reconciliation is also possible in the level of the logical
layer by a classical authenticated communication channel and by traditional algorithmical tools.
The multidimensional approaches were developed for this purpose, however the use of complex
multidimensional calculations is also not desirable in a practical scenario. The proposed scalar
reconciliation eliminates the use of multidimensional spherical space along with the dimensional
boundaries. The scalar reconciliation process neither requires any physical-layer tomography, and
only standard operations and calculations needed in the level of raw data. The method provides an
easy implementation to maximize the extractable valuable binary information from the correlated
raw data to significantly boost up the key rates and to improve the distance ranges of CVQKD.
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A Appendix
A.1 Spherical Code
A d -dimensional spherical code X is defined over the d -dimensional unit sphere Γd−1, given by
Γd−1=
(
x= (x0, x1, . . . ,xd−1)∈Rd: ‖x‖= 1
)
, and ‖x‖= 1 is the unit norm. The (d−1)-dimensional
surface S
(
Γd−1
)
of Γd−1 is defined as S
(
Γd−1
)
=2pid/2/G (d/2), where G (d/2) = ∫∞0 t(d/2)−1e−tdt
is the gamma function [24]. The number of codewords of the code is |X |, the smallest dimension
dmin of any Euclidean space for the spherical code X is dmin= dim |X |, while the minimum distance
between any two elements x and y of X⊆Γd−1, x 6=y, is D= min
{
‖x−y‖2
}
.
A.2 Gaussian Random Spherical Vectors
Let X = (X0, . . . ,Xd−1)T∈Rd be a Gaussian random vector with independent components, and with
norm ‖X‖ drawn from an N (0, σ2) memoryless Gaussian source. Over the d -dimensional unit
sphere Γd−1, spherical Gaussian random vector E [‖X‖] (X/‖X‖)∈Γd−1∈Rd has radius r=E ‖X‖,
where E is the mean of the norm ‖X‖, defined [24] as
E [‖X‖] =
√
2σ2G (d+12 )
G (d2) =
√
2piσ2
β
(
d
2 ,
1
2
) , (A.1)
where β (x, y) =G(x)G(y)G(x+y) , is the beta function, while E
[
‖X‖2
]
=dσ2. The Gaussian random vector
X∈Rd over Γd−1 has a probability density function
f (X) =
2rd−1e
−r2
2σ2
G (k2) (2σ2)k/2 , (A.2)
and variance
var [X] =dσ2− 2piσ
2
β2
(
d
2 ,
1
2
) . (A.3)
For d→∞, E
∥∥∥X/√dσ2∥∥∥→1, and r= limd→∞ ∥∥∥X/√dσ2∥∥∥→1. The distribution of r approximates
the Dirac distribution Dd (x), and gets to arbitrary close for d→∞.
A.3 Abbreviations
AWGN Additive White Gaussian Noise
BAWGN Binary Additive White Gaussian Noise
BS Beam Splitter
BSC Binary Symmetric Channel
CDF Cumulative Distribution Function
CLT Central Limit Theorem
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CV Continuous-Variable
DPR Differential Phase Reference
DV Discrete-Variable
LDPC Low Density Parity Check
PM Prepare-and-Measure: entanglement-free protocol
RR Reverse Reconciliation
SNR Signal-to-Noise Ratio
A.4 Notations
The notations of the manuscript are summarized in Table A.1.
Table A.1: Summary of notations.
Notation Description
|ϕi〉 The first mode of the combined beam, phase space vector, expressed as
|ϕi〉 =
∣∣xA,i+x′B,i+i (pA,i+p′B,i)〉 ,
where xA,i, x
′
B,i and pA,i, p
′
B,i are the position and momentum quadratures.
|φi〉 The second mode of the combined beam, phase space vector, expressed as
|φi〉 =
∣∣xA,i−x′B,i+i (pA,i−p′B,i)〉 ,
where xA,i, x
′
B,i and pA,i, p
′
B,i are the position and momentum quadratures.
|ξi〉 The noisy version of phase space state |φi〉 , with the noisy quadratures,
|ξi〉 =
∣∣x′A,i−x′′B,i+i (p′A,i−p′′B,i)〉 .
X Alice’s N -unit length raw data generated by N random quadrature mea-
surements. Binary string, consists of N/d number of d -dimensional Gaus-
sian random vectors, Xj∈Rd.
X ′ Bob’s N -unit length raw data generated by N random quadrature mea-
surements. Binary string, consists of N/d number of noisy d -dimensional
Gaussian random vectors X′j∈Rd.
Xi Alice’s raw data unit, obtained from a random quadrature measurement,
Xi=xA,i+x
′
B,i,
Xi=pA,i+p
′
B,i,
where xA,i, x
′
B,i and pA,i, p
′
B,i are the position and momentum quadratures.
X ′i Bob’s noisy raw data unit, obtained from a random quadrature measure-
ment and by a correction +2xB,i or +2pB,i,
X ′i=x
′
A,i+x
′′
B,i,
X ′i=p
′
A,i+p
′′
B,i,
while x′A,i, x
′′
B,i and p
′
A,i, p
′′
B,i are the noisy position and momentum quadra-
tures.
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Xj Alice’s d -dimensional Gaussian random vector (d unit length Gaussian ran-
dom vector),
Xj∈Rd: {Xj,0, Xj,1, . . .Xj,d−1},
where Xj,i is a Gaussian random variable.
Xj,i∈R, X ′j,i∈R The i -th unit of j -th vector Xj and X′j .
X′j Bob’s noisy d -dimensional Gaussian random vector (d unit length vector),
X′j∈Rd:
{
X ′j,0, X
′
j,1, . . .X
′
j,d−1
}
,
where X ′j,i=x
′
A,i+x
′′
B,i or X
′
j,i=p
′
A,i+p
′′
B,i is a Gaussian random units ob-
tained from a quadrature measurement.
K Bob’s secret key vector,
K=
{
U0, . . .U(N/d)−1
}∈RN/d.
The full key is granulated into N/d number of Uj∈Rd vectors,
Uj= {Uj,0, Uj,1, . . .Uj,d−1}∈Rd,
where Uj∈{a, b}∈R.
X′jUj∈Rd Bob’s d -dimensional vector sent to the classical channel.
X ′j,iUj,i∈R A unit of Bob’s d -dimensional message sent to the classical channel.
C (·) The Gaussian CDF function.
C (·) Covariance matrix.
Dd (·) Dirac distribution of a d -dimensional vector.
L Lyapunov coefficient, LB0.
U ′j The noisy version of Bob’s secret Uj ,
U ′j=
∑d−1
i=0 U
′
j,i,
where a unit Uj,i is as
U ′j,i=
(
C
(
X ′j,i
)
Uj,i
)
1
C(Xj,i)
.
δj, δj,i Noise on U
′
j=
∑d−1
i=0 U
′
j,i, and on unit Uj,i.
η Standard deviation of the noise vector
−→
δj , η =
√(
σ2δj
)
d
.
Λj , Λj,i Standard Gaussian random noise vector, and the noise of the i -th unit of
the j -th block Xj,i, Λj=N (0, 1)d∈Rd, and Λj,i=N (0, 1)∈R.
∆j Gaussian random noise vector of the quantum channel N2 on Xj ,
∆j=N
(
0, σ22
)
d
∈Rd.
∆j,i The i -th unit of j -th noise vector, that results raw data unit
X ′j,i=Xj,i+∆j,i, where ∆j,i=N
(
0, σ22
)∈R.
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